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AMERICA OFF-LINE: 
A LOOK AT THE APPLICABILITY OF  
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT  
ON STREAMING DIGITAL MEDIA  
AND THE INTERNET 
SEAN POPE* 
 
In 2012, the National Association for the Deaf brought suit against 
Netflix for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by not 
captioning their streaming on-demand video content.  The National 
Association for the Deaf won at the District Court level and Netflix has 
since settled the case.  However, this case brought to the forefront the 
widening split between those Circuit Courts of Appeal which do not feel 
the ADA applies to online businesses, and those Circuits which believe that 
the ADA does apply to online businesses.  One problem that complicates 
the analysis is the distinction and applicability of the ADA between 
commercial websites that also maintain brick and mortar storefronts and 
interactive websites that are exclusively online.  As detailed in this 
Comment, the growing disparity between ADA-compliant websites and 
non-compliant websites necessitates a common approach by the courts in 
order to bring the Internet in line with the intent of the ADA, to give people 
with disabilities the same type of access to services and goods that is 
afforded everyone else. 
 
                                                          
*J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2014; B.A., Loyola Marymount University, 2010.  The 
author would like to first thank his family for their continuous support and encouragement 
leading up to and during law school.  He would also like to thank Professors Evan Gerstmann and 
S. Michael Kernan for their assistance during the writing of this Comment, Steven Farenbaugh 
for helping steer this topic in the right direction, and Chad Russo and Meghan Camara for their 
careful proofreading.   Finally he would like to express his sincerest gratitude to the staff of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for each person’s role in bringing this Article 
to publishable form. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all with an historic 
opportunity.  It signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion 
of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.” 
President George H. W. Bush, July 26, 1990 
 
To begin, a hypothetical: Trey is a blind individual on his way to 
attend a lecture series at a local private university.  After his wife drives 
him to campus and parks in a handicapped parking space, Trey asks for 
directions from a security guard as he makes his way across campus to his 
business school.  The lecture is on the fourth floor of the building, so Trey 
heads to the elevators, led by his guide dog.  As he gets in, he feels the 
Braille lettering next to each floor to ensure that he is pushing the right 
number.  Upon arrival to his floor, he once again asks for assistance to find 
the appropriate classroom and then settles into his seat, his guide dog lying 
down on the floor next to him. 
All of these benefits — the Braille lettering, the handicapped parking 
spaces, and the guide dog accessibility — are available to Trey as a result 
of the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 (“ADA”).1  
However, at the time the ADA was envisioned, the Internet was not as 
ubiquitous as it is now.  Let’s take Trey again, but instead of attending the 
lecture at his local private university, he enrolls in a class at an online 
university.  This university does not have a physical campus, only an office 
to support its online operations.  It independently contracts professors who 
teach courses from their homes.  Students attend classes from wherever 
they have access to a computer.  Would this university have to comply with 
ADA regulations, such as making the website accessible to screen-reading 
technology and captioning the video that it displays on the website within 
the class modules?  The answer depends on the Circuit in which a potential 
lawsuit is initiated.  Although it would be a case of first impression for any 
court in the United States, other cases involving ADA compliance with 
exclusively online businesses have not fared well.2  The possibility that a 
physical university would be treated differently than an online university in 
terms of compliance with the ADA is at odds with the bill’s congressional 
                                                          
1.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (describing the findings and purpose of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act).  
 
2.  See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that 
the Ninth Circuit has not given “a place of public accommodation” a more expansive meaning).  
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intent, namely, “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”3  As 
the Internet has become such a large part of most Americans’ lives, the 
assertion that the ADA was passed to “address the major areas of 
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities” in the physical 
world alone can no longer stand.4 
This Comment will first summarize the current ADA jurisprudence 
and decisions, especially pertaining to Title III, through a case study of the 
recent decision of National Association of the Deaf vs. Netflix.5  Next, it 
will examine the Circuit split that has resulted in two different readings and 
applications of the “public accommodations” language of Title III.6  
Finally, it proposes a new reading and interpretation of the current standard 
of public accommodations in order to meet the current challenges facing 
the disabled now and in an increasingly Internet-based world.  The 
dichotomy between traditional, physical businesses, and exclusively online 
businesses must be remedied to bring both under the purview of the ADA 
and to ensure that this historic legislation continues to “provide clear, 
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”7 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ADA AND TITLE III 
The ADA was the result of two years of congressional wrangling, 
which ended with the comprehensive civil rights bill passing both Houses 
of Congress in overwhelming fashion in 1990.8  Title III of the ADA 
focuses on the definition of public accommodations9 and states that, “[n]o 
                                                          
3.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).  
 
4.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (emphasis added).  
 
5.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012).  
 
6.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2012).  
 
7.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).  
 
8.  Sara D. Watson, A Study in Legislative Strategy: The Passage of the ADA, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
ALL AMERICANS 25, 25 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993).  
 
9.  Jeffrey S. Ranen, Note, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA Applicability 
to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 394 (2002).  
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individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.”10  This was a pioneering triumph and a leap forward for 
disabled Americans who had long suffered from inadequate 
accommodations.11 
However, the basic foundations of Title III trace their origin back to 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that, “[a]ll persons 
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of 
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or 
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”12  
Title III thus extended many of the same rights that were afforded to those 
who were discriminated against because of race to those who face 
discrimination due to disability, such as the physically handicapped.13  For 
example, Title III’s definition for a place of lodging as a place of public 
accommodation is almost identical to the Civil Rights Act’s definition.14  In 
fact, three of the four specific categories of public accommodations 
codified in the Civil Rights Act are replicated in Title III’s public 
accommodations list.15  However, Title III of the ADA was written to be 
                                                          
10.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012). 
 
11.  Faye Kuo, Comment, Open and Closed: Captioning Technology as a Means to 
Equality, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 159, 161-163 (2004); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
101-485, pt. 3, at 23-26 (1990).  
 
12.  Wendy E. Parmet, Title III—Public Accommodations, in IMPLEMENTING THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 123, 
123 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); 42 U.S.C.A § 2000a (2012).  
 
13.  Id. at 123-24. 
 
14.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A) (2012) (“an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of 
lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five 
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the 
residence of such proprietor”), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012) (“any inn, hotel, motel, or 
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment 
located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is 
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence.”). 
 
15.  Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(2) (“any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch 
counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on 
the premises”), with 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B) (2012) (“a restaurant, bar, or other establishment 
serving food or drink”).  Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(3) (“any motion picture house, 
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much more encompassing than the earlier Civil Rights Act, which “only 
applied to a select number of facilities, many of which were traditionally 
regulated for public benefit under common law.”16  Congress’s intent 
behind the ADA was to remove impediments and encompass almost all 
aspects of public life.17  In order to accomplish this, Congress wrote Title 
III to include twelve broad categories of public accommodations, in 
contrast to the Civil Rights Act’s four categories.18  In fact, Title III went 
even further with a provision embodying all “commercial facilities,” which 
meant facilities “that are intended for nonresidential use; and whose 
operations will affect commerce.”19  In effect, Title III covers essentially all 
entities in the physical public sphere, whereas its predecessor, the Civil 
Rights Act, was tailored to only incorporate a small number of entities.20 
The Department of Justice has stated that, “the ADA mandate for ‘full 
and equal enjoyment’ requires nondiscrimination by a place of public 
accommodation in the offering of all its goods and services, including those 
offered via Web sites,” but no formal rulemaking has been promulgated by 
any federal agency that would require online businesses and websites be 
ADA compliant.21 
                                                          
theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment”), with 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (“a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of 
exhibition or entertainment.”).  
 
16.  Parmet, supra note 13, at 123; 42 U.S.C.A § 2000a. 
 
17.  Hayley M. Koteen, Note, Ending the Disconnect for the Deaf Community: How 
Amendments to the Federal Regulations Can Realign the ADA with Its Purpose, 29 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 431 (2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 22-23 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to 
bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life.”). 
 
18.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4) (2012).  
 
19.  Wendy E. Parmet, Title III—Public Accommodations, in IMPLEMENTING THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 123, 
124 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2)(A)-(B) .  
 
20.  Wendy E. Parmet, Title III—Public Accommodations, in IMPLEMENTING THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 123, 
123 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993). 
 
21.   Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and 
Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 
43,460, 463 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35-36).  
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III. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF V. NETFLIX 
The case National Association of the Deaf vs. Netflix illustrates a 
typical Title III analysis, and provides an example of the problems 
individuals and organizations face when bringing suits against online 
businesses.22  The case was brought by two non-profit organizations on 
behalf of both deaf and hearing-impaired individuals23 in connection with 
the “Watch Instantly” service offered by Netflix.24  “Watch Instantly” 
allows Netflix subscribers to stream thousands of movies and TV shows 
directly onto their computers, phones, or any other Internet-enabled 
devices.25  However, the plaintiffs alleged that only a small portion of 
Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” library contained closed captioning.26  Closed 
captioning provides for captioned text that is activated while watching 
television, which “allows deaf and hard of hearing individuals to view 
television shows and movies by reading” these captions.27  “[B]y failing to 
provide closed captioning on most of its ‘Watch Instantly’” titles, the 
plaintiffs argued that Netflix was denying equal access to viewing for the 
deaf and hard of hearing.28  Based on the lack of universal closed 
captioning, the plaintiffs brought a claim under Article III of the ADA 
alleging that Netflix’s failure to caption the entirety of its library was a 
form of disability discrimination.29 
                                                          
22.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 196 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 
23.  Id. at 199.  
 
24.  See generally How Does Netflix Work?, NETFLIX.COM, https://help.netflix.com/en 
/node/412 (last visited April 19, 2014).  
 
25.  Id. 
 
26.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
 
27.  Id. 
 
28.  Federal District Court in Massachusetts First in Country to Hold That the Americans 
With Disabilities Act Applies to Website-Only Businesses, NATIONAL ASS’N OF THE DEAF (June 
19, 2012, 8:25 PM), http://www.nad.org/news/2012/6/landmark‐ precedent‐ nad‐ vs‐ netflix. 
 
29.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d, at 199. The claim was brought specifically 
under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012), which states in pertinent part, “[n]o individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.” 
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Defendant Netflix responded with a motion to dismiss on the basis 
that when Congress passed the Twenty-First Century Communications and 
Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (“CVAA”), it gave the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) primary jurisdiction over 
regulation of closed captioning by businesses that offered streaming 
video.30  Netflix filed for a judgment on the pleadings based on four main 
arguments.31  First, it alleged that the plaintiffs had not successfully pled 
that Netflix was a “place of public accommodation,” a necessary 
component of any action claiming noncompliance with the ADA.32  
Second, it argued that the plaintiffs had not successfully alleged that 
Netflix had control over the captioning, another necessary component of 
the action.33  Third, it argued that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the ADA 
was precluded by Congress’ subsequent passage of the CVAA, which gave 
primary jurisdiction over closed captioning in streaming video to the 
FCC.34  Finally, Netflix alleged that the plaintiffs’ claim was moot because 
the FCC had already promulgated regulations about closed captioning on 
the Internet.35  The District Court of Massachusetts addressed each of these 
claims in their opinion before finding for the plaintiffs.36 
 
A. Place of Public Accommodation 
 
In order to state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that the 
discrimination occurred at or involved the services of a place of public 
accommodation.37  Section 12181(7) of the ADA lists twelve categories of 
private entities that are considered “public accommodations” for purposes 
                                                          
30.  Id. 
 
31.  Id. at 199-200. 
 
32.  Id. 
 
33.  Id. at 200. 
 
34.  Id.  
 
35.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200, 204. 
 
36.  Id. at 208. 
 
37.  See id. at 200.  
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of the ADA.38  The plaintiffs in National Association for the Deaf 
maintained that Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” service fell within the scope of 
at least four of the categories: “place of exhibition and entertainment,”39 
“place of . . . recreation,”40 “sales or rental establishment,”41 and “service 
establishment.”42  The plaintiffs analogized that Netflix’s streaming service 
was the same as any physical video rental store or movie theater, and ought 
to be held to the same standards under the ADA.43  They relied on the First 
Circuit’s holding in Carparts Distribution Center v. Auto Wholesaler’s 
Association, that a business must comply to ADA standards even if it does 
not have a physical location.44  Netflix argued that Carparts was not 
relevant because it dealt with an entity that conducted its business over the 
phone and by mail, while the “Watch Instantly” feature was exclusively 
web-based.45  Netflix also contended that 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), which 
defines the twelve categories of places of public accommodations, does not 
specifically address online business, and thus the ADA was an inapplicable 
basis for a cause of action in that situation.46 
The court swiftly denied all of Netflix’s contentions by reasoning that 
Congress intended for the ADA to grow and adapt to the times.47  It 
                                                          
38.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).  
 
39.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (stating “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, 
stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.”).  
 
40.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (stating “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf 
course, or other place of exercise or recreation.”).  
 
41.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) (stating “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware 
store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment.”).  
 
42.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (stating “a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, 
beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant 
or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or 
other service establishment”); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 196, 200.   
 
43.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 
44.  Id. (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Assoc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 
1994)).  
 
45.  Id. 
 
46.  Id. 
 
47.  Id. at 200-01. 
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explained that the ADA made no mention of online businesses because 
those types of businesses were simply inconceivable at the time of the 
ADA’s passage in 1990.48  The court noted that the twelve categories of 
public accommodations were purposefully left open-ended after a few 
general examples so that it could keep pace with the changing times.49 
Netflix finally asserted that because the “Watch Instantly” service is 
accessed and viewed in private homes and not in public, the website could 
not be a place of public accommodation.50  In support if its position, 
Netflix reasoned that the principle of ejusdem generis51 applies to the 
twelve categories of public accommodations, in that all of the listed places 
are only accessible outside of the home.52  The court found this line of 
reasoning unpersuasive and stated that, “[t]he ADA covers the services ‘of’ 
a public accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a public 
accommodation.”53  It followed the reasoning in Carparts and held that if 
the ADA applies to businesses that provide their products over the phone 
and via mail, then Netflix, which offers services over the Internet, should 
be bound by the ADA as well.54 
 
B. Control 
 
In addition to showing that the discrimination occurred at or involved 
the services of a place of public accommodation, “a plaintiff must also 
show that a defendant ‘owns, leases (or leases to), or operates’ a place of 
public accommodation.”55  The relevant standard developed though ADA 
                                                          
48.  Id. 
 
49.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200-01. 
 
50.  Id. at 201.  
 
51.  Id. (citing United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) and noting that 
the principle of ejusdem generis provides that “where general words…follow the enumeration of 
particular classes of things…, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of 
the same general class as those enumerated . . . .”). 
 
52.  Id.  
 
53.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012)).  
 
54.  Id. at 201-02.  
 
55.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).  
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jurisprudence is whether the defendant “specifically controls the 
modification of the [things at issue] to improve their accessibility to the 
disabled.”56  Netflix claimed that the company did not hold the copyrights 
to the content on its site, and that only the copyright holders have the 
exclusive ability to enable closed captioning.57  Netflix also explained that 
in order to caption the content contained in its “Watch Instantly” library, it 
would have to get permission from the owners of each video, movie, or 
television show that it streams.58 
The court quickly dispatched this argument by stating that Netflix was 
a “Watch Instantly” website and service, therefore making it an “owner” 
and “operator” of a place of public accommodation for the purposes of the 
ADA.59 
C. The CVAA 
 
Netflix’s next argument was that the passage of the CVAA supplanted 
the ADA because Congress subsequently passed it to deal with a handful of 
online-based activities.60  By removing captioning of streaming video from 
the purview of the ADA, the CVAA became the final word on the subject, 
and any right of action for relief had to be established by the FCC.61  The 
CVAA thus created an exception for streaming video captioning from the 
larger, more general disability discrimination because, “[w]hen one statute 
speaks in general terms while the other is specific, conflicting provisions 
may be reconciled by carving out an exception from the more general 
enactment for the more specific statute.” 62  Netflix alleged that under the 
CVAA and the subsequent rule promulgated by the FCC, the owners of the 
copyrighted video programming were responsible for captioning, not the 
distributor.63  Accordingly, as a distributor, it did not have the 
                                                          
56.  Id. (quoting Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)).  
 
57.  Id. 
 
58.  Id.  
 
59.  Id.  (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).  
 
60.  Id. at 203. 
 
61.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
 
62.  Id. (citing Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).  
 
63.  Id. at 204; see also 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(c)(1) (2012) (stating “[e]ach video programming 
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responsibility under the CVAA to provide closed captioning, even if it 
would have under the ADA.64  Under the CVAA, Netflix explained that its 
only obligation was to provide the rendering of the captioning to anyone 
accessing its “Watch Instantly” service.65 
The court reasoned that even if Netflix had a duty under the ADA to 
provide captioning for their library of “Watch Instantly” programming, it 
would not be in direct conflict with any provision of the CVAA.66  Indeed, 
the court also pointed out that the CVAA’s requirement that video owners 
supply the captioning would make it easier for Netflix and other video 
distributors to comply with their ADA duties.67 
Netflix also alleged that the CVAA barred any private right of action, 
and established an administrative complaint process that the plaintiffs were 
attempting to circumvent.68  However, the court reasoned that the CVAA’s 
predecessor, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, allowed for separate 
administrative and judicial routes in order to remedy conflicts.69  The court 
went on to state, “[t]here is no indication that the CVAA, unlike the 
Telecommunications Act, extinguishes private rights of action under the 
ADA for closed captioning of video programming on the Internet.”70 
Finally, Netflix argued that the CVAA permits the FCC to grant full 
                                                          
owner must: (i) Send program files to video programming distributors and providers with 
captions as required by this section, with at least the same quality as the television captions 
provided for the same programming . . . .”). 
 
64.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 204. 
 
65.  See id. at 203-06; see also 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(c)(1)(i)-(ii).  
 
66.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 204. 
 
67.  Id. 
 
68.  Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 79.4(e)-(f) (stating “(e) Complaint procedures. (1) Complaints 
concerning an alleged violation of the closed captioning requirements of this section shall be filed 
in writing with the Commission or with the video programming distributor or provider 
responsible for enabling the rendering or pass through of the closed captions for the video 
programming within sixty (60) days after the date the complainant experienced a problem with 
captioning . . . (f) Private rights of action prohibited. Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this section.  The Commission 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any complaint under this section”). 
 
69.  Id. at 204-05; see also Zulauf v. Kentucky Educ. Television, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 
1023-24 (E.D. Ky. 1988).  
 
70.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
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or partial exemptions from the captioning requirement if an economic 
burden can be shown and that the plaintiffs were seeking to have them held 
liable under the ADA without considering these very exceptions.71  The 
court stated that the ADA also contains an economic burden exception, but 
declined to conduct the analysis.72 
In its decision, the court found that the CVAA overlapped the ADA 
and that it imposed some different requirements on video programming 
distributors.73  However, there was nothing inherently contradictory 
between the two statutes that would prevent them from being given effect 
together.74 
The court next looked at the scope of the CVAA to see if it covered 
the entirety of the Netflix “Watch Instantly” service.75  Netflix, in a narrow 
reading of the CVAA, argued that the CVAA only applied to programming 
that is shown: (1) on television, (2) with closed captioning, (3) after the 
date of the FCC rule promulgation.76  It also stated that the FCC made a 
choice to include only certain types of video programming under the 
                                                          
71.  Id.; see 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(d) (stating “(1) A video programming provider or owner 
may petition the Commission for a full or partial exemption from the closed captioning 
requirements of this section, which the Commission may grant upon a finding that the 
requirements would be economically burdensome . . . (2) . . . The Commission will consider the 
following factors when determining whether the requirements for closed captioning of Internet 
protocol-delivered video programming would be economically burdensome: (i) The nature and 
cost of the closed captions for the programming; (ii) The impact on the operation of the video 
programming provider or owner; (iii) The financial resources of the video programming provider 
or owner; and (iv) The type of operations of the video programming provider or owner.”).   
 
72.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 205; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
(2012) (stating “[discrimination includes the following], unless the entity can demonstrate that 
taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, 
advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden . . . .”).  
 
73.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 205.  
 
74.  Id. (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)) (“Redundancies across 
statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy 
between two laws . . . a court must give effect to both.” (internal citation omitted)).  
 
75.  See id. at 206.  
 
76.  Id. See also 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(b) (“All nonexempt full length video programming [47 
U.S.C. § 79.4(a)(2): “Full-length video programming. Video programming that appears on 
television and is distributed to end users, substantially in its entirety, via Internet protocol . . . .”] 
delivered using Internet protocol must be provided with closed captions if the programming is 
published or exhibited on television in the United States with captions on or after the following 
dates . . . .)” 
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CVAA.77  The court held that although the CVAA only covered limited 
types of streaming video programming, Congress did not intend to limit the 
ADA in such a way as to leave the plaintiffs in this case without a remedy, 
and declined to allow the CVAA to limit the ADA in this situation.78 
 
D. Mootness 
 
Netflix’s last argument was that since the FCC had already 
promulgated regulations defining the responsibilities of distributors of 
Internet streaming video, the plaintiffs could no longer bring an action.79  
The court soundly rejected this because the CVAA did not cover all of the 
programming that the plaintiffs were alleging was in violation of the ADA, 
and because the CVAA did not carve out exceptions to the ADA.80  The 
court further reiterated that because the plaintiffs had brought the action 
under the ADA, whether or not the FCC regulations had already gone into 
effect was immaterial to the outcome of the case.81 
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON “PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION” 
The holding in Netflix was based in part on previous rulings that were 
binding upon the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts as part of the First Circuit.82  The case hinged on a reading 
of “place of public accommodation” as interpreted by the First Circuit in 
Carparts Distribution Center v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Association of 
New England.83  The Netflix court followed the reasoning in Carparts that 
“places of public accommodation” are not merely limited to physical 
places.84  In a case of first impression in the First Circuit,85 the Court found 
                                                          
77.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 206. 
 
78.  Id. at 207-08.   
 
79.  Id. at 208.  
 
80.  Id. 
 
81.  Id. 
 
82.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201-02 (D. Mass. 2012).  
 
83.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 
12, 12 (1st Cir. 1994).  
 
84.  Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200.   
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that the plain meaning of the entities discussed under the “public 
accommodations” section of Title III of the ADA,86 such as a “travel 
service”87 or a “service establishment,”88 was, at worst, ambiguous.89  The 
court went on to reason that the plain meaning of the terms did not require 
any of these entities to have physical structures.90  It further stated: 
[O]ne can easily imagine the existence of other service establishments 
conducting business by mail and phone without providing facilities for 
their customers to enter in order to utilize their services.  It would be 
irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase services 
are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services 
over the telephone or by mail are not.  Congress could not have intended 
such an absurd result.91 
This reasoning92 has been followed by several other Circuits over the 
years.93  Chief Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in 
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company,94 cited Carparts95 when 
stating that “a place of public accommodation” could encompass a physical 
or electronic space.96  The Second Circuit ruled similarly in finding that an 
insurance company was meant to be included in the spirit of the plain 
                                                          
85.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19. 
 
86.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).  
 
87.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).  
 
88.  Id. 
 
89.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19. 
 
90.  Id. 
 
91.  Id. 
 
92.  That Title III of the ADA applies not only to physical places of public 
accommodation, but also to non-physical locations. 
 
93.  See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 
94.  Id. 
 
95.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 12. 
 
96.  Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.  
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meaning of an “insurance office.”97  By holding that “the statute was meant 
to guarantee [the disabled] more than mere physical access,”98 the Court 
further opened the door for non-physical spaces to be included within the 
meaning of “public accommodations.”99 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit tackled the “public accommodation” 
issue when five plaintiffs sued the producers of “Who Wants To Be A 
Millionaire.”100  The show selected contestants by having aspiring 
participants call a toll-free automated telephone number to answer a series 
of trivia questions.101  Contestants who answered all of the questions 
correctly moved on to the second round.102  The plaintiffs were all either 
deaf or had limited finger mobility which prevented them from registering 
their answers on their telephone keypads.103  The Court found that a plain 
and unambiguous reading of the language revealed that the “public 
accommodations” provision covered both “tangible barriers” and 
“intangible barriers.”104  As such, it held that Title III of the ADA applied 
to the telephone selection process of contestants for “Who Wants To Be A 
Millionaire.”105 
However, as the First, Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits found 
that “public accommodations” covered physical and non-physical 
entities,106 other Circuits were meanwhile holding that “public 
                                                          
97.  See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2012) (listing “insurance office” as a place of “public accommodation.”). 
 
98.  Id. at 32.  
 
99.  Id. at 33.  
 
100.  See generally Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).  
 
101.  Id. at 1280.  
 
102.  Id. at 1280. 
 
103.  Id. at 1280-81. 
 
104.  Id. at 1283.   
 
105.  Id. at 1286. 
 
106.  See generally Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 
198 F.3d 28 (2nd Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New 
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).  
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accommodations” only consisted of physical locations.107 
Curiously, all four Circuits that found Title III applied only to 
physical entities dealt with similar facts involving insurance.108  The Sixth 
Circuit found that Title III did not prevent an employer from providing 
different benefits for employees who became disabled due to physical 
illness, as opposed to those who became disabled due to mental illness.109  
It defined a “public accommodation” as “a facility, operated by a private 
entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the 
twelve ‘public accommodation’ categories.”110  In reasoning that it was not 
a “public accommodation,” the court cited two Sixth Circuit cases in which 
it had found that associations did not fall under the purview of Title III.111  
A dissenting opinion argued that the reasoning in favor of extending Article 
III to non-physical structures, as articulated by Carparts,112 was more in 
tune with Congress’ intent.113 
The Third Circuit, in dealing with the issue, also found that disparities 
in insurance benefits for mental and physical disabilities offered by 
employers did not violate the ADA.114  The court reasoned that since the 
employee had received her insurance from her employer, she had no nexus 
to the insurance company’s physical office.115  In addition, the court, when 
distinguishing Carparts, said that the First Circuit did not follow the 
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “[a] canon of construction holding that the 
                                                          
107.  See generally McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2000); Weyer v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th 
Cir. 1997). 
 
108.  Id.   
 
109.  Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.  
 
110.  Id. at 1011 (citing Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 
583 (6th Cir. 1995)).  
 
111.  See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 
1997); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 (citing Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 
1026, 1036 (6th Cir. 1995)).  
 
112.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.  
 
113.  Parker, 121 F.3d at 1019-20.  
 
114.  See Ford, 145 F.3d at 601.  
 
115.  Id. at 612-13. 
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meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words 
immediately surrounding it,”116 in deciding the ambiguous nature of the 
examples under “public accommodations.”117  These terms, the Third 
Circuit reasoned, “should be interpreted by reference to the accompanying 
words of the statute ‘to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts 
of Congress.’”118  The court held that “public accommodations” did not 
encompass non-physical entities, and that the meaning of the terms was not 
ambiguous.119 
The Fifth Circuit found that although Title III prohibited owners and 
lessees from preventing the disabled from being able to access a physical 
place, it could not be applied to regulate the goods and services offered.120  
It reasoned that, “in many, if not most, cases, the disabled simply will not 
have the capacity or ability to enjoy the goods and services of an 
establishment ‘fully’ and ‘equally’ compared to the non-disabled.”121  It 
inferred that some goods and services are inherent to the nature of the 
business, such as a movie theater or a tennis arena.122  The court reasoned 
that a blind individual may enjoy attending tennis matches, but it would be 
impossible to rectify the situation through the ADA where the blind person 
would be able to have the same experience as someone with their sight.123  
To go against this logic, “[r]estaurants would have to limit their menus to 
avoid discriminating against diabetics.”124  The court argued that Title III 
had to be interpreted and construed with functional and practical 
boundaries.125  In doing this, it explained it had to prevent Title III from 
                                                          
116.  Noscitur a sociis is Latin for “it is known by its associates.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1160-61 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
117.  Ford, 145 F.3d at 614.   
 
118.  Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).  
 
119.  Id. 
 
120.  McNeil, 205 F.3d at 186. 
 
121.  Id. at 187  
 
122.  Id.   
 
123.  Id. 
 
124.  Id. 
 
125.  Id. 
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being applied to all goods and services, as there was no non-arbitrary way 
to distinguish goods that ought to be protected from goods that ought not to 
be protected.126  The “good” being offered there was insurance, which is 
not protected under the “public accommodations” statute because the Fifth 
Circuit held that the owner of a place of public accommodation did not 
need to modify its goods and services in order to avoid a Title III 
violation.127 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Title III only covered physical 
locations.128  Following the Sixth129 and Third130 decisions, the court first 
determined that the principle of noscitur a sociis required that “public 
accommodation” be interpreted within the context of all of its qualifying 
words.131  After looking at all twelve categories of establishments under 
“public accommodation,”132 the court found that, “some connection 
between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is 
required.”133  As in all previous cases in which the various Circuits found 
that Title III did not apply to insurance companies,134 the Ninth Circuit 
could not find a nexus between the benefit plan offered by an employer and 
a good offered by a place of public accommodation.135 
The Third,136 Sixth,137 and Ninth138 Circuit decisions all dealt with 
                                                          
126.  McNeil, 205 F.3d at 187.  
 
127.  Id. at 188.  
 
128.  Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115.  
 
129.  Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014 (“To interpret these terms [of §12181(7) and subsection 
(F)] as permitting a place of accommodation to constitute something other than a physical place is 
to ignore the text of the statute and the principle of nonscitur a sociis.”). 
 
130.  Ford, 145 F.3d at 614  (“Pursuant to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the terms that 
the First Circuit finds ambiguous should be interpreted by reference to the accompanying words 
of the statute ‘to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’”).  
 
131.  Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114.   
 
132.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2012). 
 
133.  Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114.    
 
134.  See McNeil,, 205 F.3d at 182; Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.  
 
135.  Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114-15.  
 
136.  Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13.  
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insurance companies administering an employer-provided disability policy.  
All three found that the policy was not a place of “public 
accommodation.”139  This directly contrasts the First,140 Second,141 
Seventh,142 and Eleventh Circuits’143 findings that Title III was implicated 
by discrimination that might have occurred in non-physical locations.  The 
facts of seven of the eight cases were remarkably similar in that they dealt 
with insurance companies.144  The sides favoring a conservative approach 
to Title III — and finding that it did not apply to non-physical locations — 
tended to conclude that the companies were insurance companies, rather 
than insurance offices.145  This is an important distinction because Title III 
only specifically mentions “insurance office[s]”146 as being “public 
accommodations,” not insurance companies.147  The Circuits that found the 
ADA could apply to non-physical entities148 took the opposite approach 
and found that since Title III expressly provides for “insurance 
office[s],”149 and the goods and services provided at insurance offices are 
mostly insurance policies, Title III is applicable to those policies as well.150 
                                                          
137.  Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.   
 
138.  Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114-15.  
 
139.  See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Ford, 145 F.3d at 614; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115.   
 
140.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.  
 
141.  Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33. 
 
142.  Doe, 179 F.3d at 559. 
 
143.  Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1286. 
 
144.  The only one of the eight that did not deal with an insurance claim was Rendon, 294 
F.3d 1279, which dealt with contestant screening for Who Wants To Be A Millionaire.  
 
145.  See, e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010. 
 
146.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2012).  
 
147.  Id. § 12181(7).   
 
148.  See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 20; Doe, 179 F.3d at 559; Pallozzi, 198 
F.3d at 33. 
 
149.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).  
 
150.  Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 31.  
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The Department of Justice has made it extremely clear that websites 
are considered “public accommodations” under Title III.151  The thrust of 
the Department of Justice’s argument is that Title III must be applicable to 
any activity or service offered by a “public accommodation” whether it is 
on or off site.152  This would appear to be out of line with the four Circuit 
Courts that have decided that Title III is only applicable to physical 
locations.153  The issue of Title III and its applicability to the Internet is one 
that Circuits have not had to grapple with much.  But based on the current 
Circuit divide between physical and non-physical locations, it will only be 
a matter of time before this issue is granted certiorari by the Supreme Court 
to clear up the division. 
V. SOCIAL MEDIA AND STREAMING CONTENT: THE NEXT HORIZON 
A. The Target and Facebook Cases 
 
On Oct. 10, 2012, Netflix entered into a joint consent decree with the 
National Association for the Deaf.154  As part of the decree, Netflix pledged 
to have closed captioning on 100% of its streaming video library within the 
next two years.155  In addition, Netflix would seek to ensure that captioning 
would be available not only on computers, but also on devices that can 
access the streaming content.156  This would seem to include the growing 
popularity of smartphones and tablet computers. 
Netflix and other streaming video providers like Hulu are joining the 
fray of online businesses that are either voluntarily adopting these policies 
                                                          
151.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and 
Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43, 
460 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 and 36). 
 
152.  Id. at 464. 
 
153.  See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; McNeil, 205 F.3d at 186; 
Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114. 
 
154.  Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, Netflix and Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf Reach 
Historic Agreement to Provide 100% Closed Captions in On-Demand Streaming Content Within 
Two Years (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with author).  
 
155.  See id.  
 
156.  See id. 
 
AMERICA OFF-LINE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  1:46 PM 
2014] AMERICA OFF-LINE 213 
or are being forced to conform to the ADA.157  However, lawsuits alleging 
noncompliance with the ADA against social media sites such as Facebook 
have not fared well for disability rights groups.158  There is a growing 
divide between online businesses that have adopted or are being forced to 
adopt the ADA provisions and those online businesses which have not.159  
This divide is most apparent between commercial sites, which tend to be 
supported by a brick and mortar business, and interactive sites, which tend 
to be exclusively online.  In National Federation of the Blind v. Target 
Corporation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California found that any aspect of Target.com which offered information 
and services about the physical location of stores and their offerings for 
sale had to be compliant with Title III, the failure of which would “impair a 
disabled person’s ‘full enjoyment’ of services or goods of a covered 
accommodation.”160  However, the court also found that any part of 
Target.com that offered information and services that were unconnected to 
any physical Target store did not fall within the purview of Title III.161  The 
court thus required a nexus between the online services and the physical 
public accommodation in order to state a claim under Title III.162 
Five years later, the same court was asked whether the social 
networking site, Facebook, had violated Title III.163  In Young v. Facebook, 
Inc., a young woman’s profile was deactivated for “behavior identified as 
potentially harassing or threatening to other Facebook users.”164  The 
woman, alleging that she suffered from bipolar disorder, filed suit against 
Facebook for unlawful discrimination by failing to provide reasonable 
                                                          
157.  See, e.g., id.; Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 950 
(N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 
158.  See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 
159.  Compare Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955, with Young, 790 F. Supp. 
2d at 1115. 
 
160.  Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) 
(2012)). 
 
161.  Id. at 956. 
 
162.  Id. at 954. 
 
163.  See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. 
 
164.  Id. at 1114.  
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customer services to individuals suffering from mental disabilities.165  The 
woman, rather than showing that Facebook was a place of public 
accommodation within the meaning of the ADA, instead relied on Carparts 
and Doe166 to show that other Circuits had found that public 
accommodations encompassed more than physical structures and 
buildings.167  However, the court stated that it was bound to follow Ninth 
Circuit precedent, which has not expanded the meaning of “place of public 
accommodation” to include more than physical structures and the services 
that encompass them.168 
The plaintiff also alleged that Facebook’s services met the Target 
nexus test as a physical place of public accommodation because it sold its 
own branded gift cards in stores all over the United States.169  In return, 
“the alleged discrimination on Facebook’s website deprive[d] her of full 
and equal access to the goods and services provided by Facebook through 
physical retail stores.”170  However, the court, in a strict reading of Title III, 
found that since Facebook does not “own, lease . . . or operate,” the stores 
where its gift cards are sold, its Internet services did not have a nexus to a 
physical place of public accommodation.171 
 
B. The Explosion of Social Media 
 
The skyrocketing use of social media websites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Pinterest requires Congress to reexamine 
the ADA to bring these online businesses into compliance with the ADA 
                                                          
165.  See id. at 1114-15.  
 
166.  Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d 12; Doe, 179 F.3d 557.  
 
167.  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; See Carparts Distrib. Ctr. Inc., 37 F.3d at 19; see 
also Doe, 179 F.3d at 559. 
 
168.  Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
 
169.  See id.  
 
170.  Id.  
 
171.  Id. at 1116 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012)) (“No individual shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public 
accommodation.”) (emphasis added).  
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by amending its public accommodations language to include non-physical 
businesses.172  If Congress decides not to act, courts can and must insert 
themselves into the conversation by stating unequivocally that online 
businesses fall within the purview of the ADA.  In general, the ADA 
prohibits discrimination against individuals enjoying public 
accommodations, such that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against 
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place 
of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 
operates a place of public accommodation.”173  Importantly here, the 
language “operates” could be interpreted to mean that online businesses 
that have no nexus to physical businesses (such as Facebook) operate 
places of public accommodation.  Such a finding, however, would still 
have to be based on one of the categories of public accommodations.  The 
statute states: 
 
The following private entities are considered public 
accommodations for purposes of this subchapter, if the 
operations of such entities affect commerce— 
 
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except 
for an establishment located within a building that contains 
not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is 
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment 
as the residence of such proprietor; 
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food 
or drink; 
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, 
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; 
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other 
place of public gathering; 
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, 
shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment; 
                                                          
172.  A recent estimate found that Facebook had 955 million users, Twitter had 500 
million users, LinkedIn had 174 million users, Instagram had 40 million users, and Pinterest had 
16.8 million users. Samantha Felix, CHARTS: See How Massive Social Media Is Now, By Users 
And Dollars, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-big-
social-media-has-become-2012-9.  
 
173.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).  
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(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty 
shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas 
station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, 
insurance office, professional office of a health care 
provider, hospital, or other service establishment; 
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified 
public transportation; 
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public 
display or collection; 
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of 
recreation; 
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or 
postgraduate private school, or other place of education; 
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless 
shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service 
center establishment; and 
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or 
other place of exercise or recreation.174 
 
A suit against a business such as Facebook could proceed under 
section (D) as a category of online business.175  Many people sign up for a 
Facebook account in order to gather and discuss events, stories, pictures, 
and memories of events that are relevant or important to them.176  It would 
be reasonable to view social media as a place of public gathering.177  Even 
the online university discussed in the introductory hypothetical could fall 
under subsection (J)’s inclusion of all places of education.178  The 
challenge in all of these cases would be to overcome the initial hurdle of 
establishing that an exclusively online business, with no connection or 
nexus to a physical business location, could be classified as a place of 
                                                          
174.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2012). 
 
175.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(D). 
 
176.  For example, the New York Giants’ official fan page on Facebook has over 3.1 
million likes, with each post garnering hundreds of comments and thousands of likes. New York 
Giants, http://www.facebook.com/newyorkgiants?fref=ts (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).  
 
177.  See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
 
178.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). 
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public accommodation.179 
In order to prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, “[a] plaintiff 
must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the 
defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public 
accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations 
by the defendant because of her disability.”180  By categorizing online 
social media businesses as places of public accommodation, Title III claims 
could be brought against them.181  One big worry of those advocating 
against such an expansive view of the ADA is a flood of Title III lawsuits 
burying online businesses in tsunamis of litigation.182  However, when 
private individuals bring a claim against places of public accommodation, 
they may only seek injunctive relief183 and reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs.184  This should prevent most, if not all, frivolous and irrelevant 
lawsuits because the people that are going to sue businesses like Facebook 
and Twitter are going to be people with disabilities.  They only want to be 
able to have full access and enjoyment of these sites – not to be awarded 
massive damages.  Only by interpreting public accommodations to include 
these exclusively online businesses will courts be able to once again satisfy 
the original purpose of the ADA.185 
Another important consideration for implementing these changes, 
whether by the courts or by Congress, is the costs that online businesses 
would incur in order to make their websites accessible.186  Title III already 
                                                          
179.  See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
 
180.  Id. (citing Ariz. ex. rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 
(9th Cir. 2010)).  
 
181.  See id. 
 
182.  See generally Faye Kuo, Comment, Open and Closed: Captioning Technology as a 
Means to Equality, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 159, 203 (2004).  
 
183.  Basically ordering the public accommodation to bring the entity within ADA 
compliance.  
 
184.  Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Persons with 
HIV/AIDS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.ada.gov/aids/ada_q&a_aids.htm#public-accm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014).  
 
185.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(4) (2012). 
 
186.  Hayley M. Koteen, Note, Ending the Disconnect for the Deaf Community: How 
Amendments to the Federal Regulations Can Realign the ADA with Its Purpose, 29 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 448  (2011). 
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carves out an undue burden exception to Title III compliance if the public 
accommodation can show that compliance would, “[f]undamentally alter 
the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or 
accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.”187  
Online businesses could use this exemption if such regulations would be 
too burdensome for them to comply, and would also prevent either the 
courts or Congress from implementing or promulgating requirements that 
would be too strict.188  Any new requirements would have to be narrow 
enough to achieve the result of online accessibility by the disabled, but not 
so strict that most online businesses would rather claim that the new 
regulations would be an undue burden and take their chances in court.189  
This would likely require “‘a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that 
considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in 
light of the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the 
organization that would implement it.’”190  A case-by-case basis of 
individual websites may prompt fears of excessive and widespread 
litigation, as was the case with movie theaters when the ADA became 
law.191  However, during the implementation of the original ADA, the 
judicial system was more than able to handle these cases.192 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The world is becoming more and more divided into groups of those 
who have access to the Internet and those who do not.  We are continually 
evolving into a global society, both in business as well as in 
communication and socialization.  A friend living in China or Bolivia is 
                                                          
187.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
 
188.  Koteen, supra note 186, at 447-48.  
 
189.  See generally id. 
 
190.  Charles D. Mockbee IV, Note, Caught in the Web of the Internet: The Application of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act to Online Businesses, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 553, 573 (2004), 
quoting Anita Ramasastry, Should Web-Only Businesses be Required to be Disabled-Accessible?, 
CNN (Nov. 7, 2002), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/07/findlaw.analysis.ramasastry.disab 
led/index.html. 
 
191.  See generally Kuo, supra note 182, at 203.  
 
192.  See David M. Stokes, Relief for the Deaf: The Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights 
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 513, 535 (1991).  
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only a few keystrokes away.  The explosive popularity of smartphones has 
made online accessibility a 24-hour-per-day possibility.193  Those who have 
access to the Internet every day and use it whenever they want may take it 
for granted, but universal access is far from reality, especially for those 
with disabilities.  Unfortunately, the ADA was not written with the 
explosion of Internet usage in mind.194  Some courts have started to rectify 
this problem by finding that businesses that maintain online and physical 
presences must make their sites pertaining to services available in their 
physical stores ADA compliant.195  Additionally, online businesses started 
to take it upon themselves to voluntarily come within ADA compliance, as 
seen in the Netflix case and subsequent consent agreement.196  However, 
there is still a significant swath of Americans who cannot enjoy free and 
unfettered access to the Internet, and that is why courts need to recognize 
that the Internet is as much a public accommodation as any brick and 
mortar storefront.197 
There is a circuit split as to whether online businesses with physical 
locations should even be viewed under the light of the ADA, with some 
saying non-physical entities should be covered under the ADA,198 and 
others saying they should not.199  However, there is also a growing 
                                                          
193.  See generally America’s New Mobile Majority: A Look at Smartphone Owners in the 
U.S., NIELSEN (May 7, 2012), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/?p=31688. 
 
194.  See Ryan C. Richards, Reconciling the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
Commercial Websites: A Feasible Solution?, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 520, 525 (2010). 
 
195.  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 
2006).  
 
196.  See generally Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 
2012); Press Release, National Association of the Deaf, Netflix and the National Association of 
the Deaf Reach Historic Agreement to Provide 100% Closed Captions in On-Demand Streaming 
Content Within Two Years (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with author).  
 
197.  Jeffrey S. Ranen, Note, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA 
Applicability to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 418 (2002). .  
 
198.  See Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Assoc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 
1994); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Pallozzi v. Allstate 
Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 
1283 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 
199.  See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 
205 F.3d 179, 188 (5th Cir. 2000); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 
1114 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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dichotomy between these commercial online businesses which have been 
found to fall under the purview of the ADA,200 and interactive online 
businesses which maintain no physical presence in which they provide 
goods or services, as their entire presence is online.201  These interactive 
sites so far have escaped having to become ADA complaint.  In the absence 
of congressional intent to change Title III, courts should begin to view 
online, non-physical entities as falling under the ADA’s umbrella of public 
accommodations.  Courts would still be able to use discretion when 
deciding whether businesses that would not have previously fallen under 
the traditional “place[s] of public gathering”202 sub-heading from having to 
expend a lot of money to meet the demands of Title III.203  The key, at least 
at first, would be to give courts a high level of flexibility when dealing with 
these first cases, as this would be an entirely new area of applicability for 
the ADA.204  The courts must be able to strike a balance in leveling the 
playing field between disabled and nondisabled Internet users, while not 
being so onerous so as to prevent most online businesses and social media 
providers from being able to meet the requirements.205  In the long run, the 
application of Title III to non-physical entities, especially social media and 
online businesses, will benefit all of those who are disabled and cannot 
access these interactive websites now.  It would seek to ensure that “all 
Americans will have an equal opportunity to connect with the goods, 
services, communities, and opportunities proliferating online everyday.”206  
This is the logical next step in the evolution of the ADA, and the 
restoration of the original goals and purposes of this historic piece of 
legislation.207  Judicial action must step up in the face of legislative 
                                                          
200.  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  
 
201.  See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 
202.  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(D) (2012). 
 
203.  For instance, it may be perfectly reasonable for a court to hold that a small blog read 
by a few dozen people each week would not fall under a “place of public gathering.” 
 
204.  See Richards, supra note 194, at 559. 
 
205.  See id. 
 
206.  Nikki D. Kessling, Why the Target “Nexus Test” Leaves Disabled Americans 
Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites are 
“Places of Public Accommodation”, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 991, 1029 (2008).  
 
207.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012). 
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inaction, especially to protect and preserve the rights of a minority class.  In 
this case, making the Internet and interactive websites accessible to every 
American to use and enjoy, must be of the utmost priority. 
